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The Washington Workmen's Compensation
Act From the Employers' Viewpoint
LOWELL P. MICKELWAIT*
Although this state has had a workmen's compensation act since
1911, the employers generally have, until recently, paid but slight
attention to the administration of the act. They have proceeded on
the theory that the accident experience of the particular employer had
little or no relation to the amount of contributions required to be made
by that employer under the act. The situation is very different today.
Every well-advised employer now realizes that, in the long run, his
industrial insurance premiums will tend to approximate the cost of the
accidents occurring in his own plant. By the maintenance of high safety
standards or other accident prevention measures the employer may
reduce substantially his accident cost experience, thereby receiving a
material reduction in his premiums payable to the Department of Labor
& Industries. This so-called "merit-rating" plan constitutes the out-
standing feature of the present law.
The Merit-Rating Plan
The original workmen's compensation act contained the germ of
the idea that the rates should conform to the accident experience.'
Industries were divided into 47 classes with different rates applicable
thereto, the division being on the basis of "equitable distribution of
burden in proportion to relative hazard". The rates and classifications
were fixed and inflexible but subject to future adjustment by the legis-
lature. The classifications of industry were made subject "to rearrange-
ment following any relative increase or decrease of hazard shown by
experience". The legislatures of 19152 and 19173 gave the department
rather broad powers as to readjustment of rates and rearrangement of
classes on the basis of accident experience.
It remained, however, for the 1931 legislature to adopt the "merit-
rating" system. The 1931 amendment 4 established the method to be
followed by the department in determining the amounts to be con-
tributed by each employer into the accident fund and the medical aid
fund. In this respect the present law5 is substantially the same as the
1931 law, and under it the amounts to be paid by the employer are
determined in the following manner:
(1) The "basic premium rate" is fixed upon the basis of the cost
experience of the entire class over the preceding two-year period.
(2) The individual employer's "cost rate" is determined upon the
basis of the cost experience of that employer over the preceding five-
year period.
(3) The actual premium rate to be paid by the employer is ascer-
tained by taking 40 per cent of the basic rate of the class plus 60
per cent of the employer's cost rate, with the ceiling fixed at 160 per
cent of the basic rate.
*Of the Seattle Bar. XV WASH. LAW REVIEw 62 (Jan. 1940).
'Laws of 1911, p. 349, ch. 74, § 4.
'Laws of 1915, p. 674, ch. 188, § 1.
3Laws of 1917, p. 477, ch. 120, § 2.
'Laws of 1931, p. 297, ch. 104, § 1.
REmd. Rsv. STAT. § 7676.
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It is thus observed that the employer's rates are the result of (1)
the experience of.his industrial class, and (2) his own experience. Con-
sequently, the law not only acts as an incentive to the individual em-
ployer to reduce his accident experience, but it also tends to induce
him to cooperate with the other employers in his class so as to decrease
the basic rate. There are in the various classes of industry a number
of examples of the results that can be obtained through accident pre-
vention measures and careful supervision of claims. In some classes
the cost experience has been gradually reduced over the last five years
with the result that successive reductions have been obtained in the
applicable rates, aid substantial reserves have been accumulated. There
are a few classes, however, where due to various- reasons the collections
from employers have been insufficient to pay the allowed claims and
deficits have been permitted to accrue. By a five-to-four decision the
Supreme Court has recently held, with respect to such insolvent classes,
that regardless of the financial condition of the particular class in which
the claim arises, the claim must be paid so long as the accident fund,
considered as a whole, remains solvent.6 As a result of this holding a
situation ,has been created whereby the reserves built up in well-
managed classes may be depleted through withdrawals made for the ben-
efit of insolvent classifications, thus undermining to a considerable
extent the merit-rating plan.
Employers' Right of Appeal
With the advent .of the merit-rating system and the consequent
realization that the awards paid claimants materially affected the em-
ployers' rates, the employers commenced to assert their rights. The
claimants, however, objected to any participation by the employers in
the proceedings involving claims filed with the department. A bitter
fight has been waged in the courts over the employer's right of par-
ticipation and appeal.
In the earlier cases, it seems to have been assumed that the employer
had the right of appeal from a decision of the department upon a claim
filed by an injured workman or other claimant. 7 After the objection
was raised, however, it required several en banc decisions to settle the
matter. State ex rel. Crabb v. Olinger8 approved the right of the em-
ployer to appeal from a departmental decision to the joint board. The
employer's right of appeal from the decision of the joint board to the
courts was then upheld in the Mud Bay Logging Co. case and cases
following it.9 However, the right of appeal was still being- contested
as late as in Cole v. Department of Labor & Industries,10 decided
August 24, 1939, where the Supreme Court apparently divided six to'
'Campbell v. Department of Labor & Industries, 102 Wash. Dec. 146, 97
P. (2d) 642 (1940); see also Lassiter v. Department of Labor & Industries,
102 Wash. Dec. 153, 97 P. (2d) 645 (1940).
'Brewer v. Department of Labor & Industries, 143 Wash. 49, 254 Pac.
831 (1927); Seattle Can Co. v. Department of Labor & Industries, 147
Wash. 303, 265 Pac. 739 (1928); Hama Hama Logging Co. v. Department
of Labor & Industries, 157 Wash. 96, 288 Pac. 655 (1930).
8191 Wash. 534, 71 P. (2d) 545 (1937).
"Mud Bay Logging Co. v. Department of Labor & Industries, 193 Wash.
275, 75 P. (2d) 579 (1938); State ex rel. Crabb v. Olinger, 196 Wash. 308,
82 P. (2d) 865 (1938); Hoff v. Department of Labor & Industries, 198 Wash.
257, 88 P. (2d) 419 (1939).
1200 Wash. 296, 93 P. (2d) 413.,
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three on the question, but continued to approve the employer's right
of appeal. It would seem that the issue has been definitely and finally
settled by the Supreme Court.
There is no doubt that an employer has a right to be heard in any
departmental proceedings involving his classification or rates, and that
he may appeal from the department's determination."-
Procedure
After the occurrence of an accident the injured workman must file
his claim with the department within the specified period of one year.' 2
Although the workman is not required to serve a copy of his claim on
the employer, the workman does have the duty of reporting the acci-
dent to the employer.13 The department first acts upon the claim
ex parte, then notifies the employer and the claimant of his order
respecting the claim. Such order is not binding upon the employer un-
less and until a copy of it is communicated to him.14
Where an award is made to the claimant, it is the practice of the
department to withhold payment for seven days after communication
of the order to the employer. If the employer protests, the payment
usually is withheld pending the appeal, but no protest is necessary to
protect the employer's right of appeal. In any event, the employer has
sixty days from the time of receipt of notice of the order of the depart-
ment within which to apply for a rehearing before the joint board. 5
Unless appealed from, any final order of the department with respect
to a claim becomes res judicata as to all interested parties. 6 For ex-
ample, if the department rejects a claim upon the ground that the acci-
dent did not occur in the course of employment and neither party ap-
peals therefrom, then, in a subsequent common law action by the
claimant against the employer, the departmental decision is binding
on the employer and the correctness of the ruling cannot be questioned.
This is upon the basis that the employer has the right of appeal from
an order denying compensation to a claimant as well as from an order
granting compensation.' 7 Consequently, employers should be on the
alert to make certain that all decisions of the department respecting
claims made by their employees are correct, whether the claim is al-
lowed or rejected.
Before any appeal is taken to the courts, resort must first be had
to the joint board by filing an application for rehearing.' 8 Such an
"REM. REv. STAT. § 7676; and see Mud Bay Logging Co. v. Department
of Labor & Industries, 193 Wash. 275, 75 P. (2d) 579 (1938).
"'REm. REv. STAT. § 7686.
REML REv. STAT. § 7689.
21REm. REv. STAT. § 7697; Mud Bay Logging Co. v. Department of Labor
& Industries, 189 Wash. 285, 64 P. (2d) 1054 (1937); affirmed on rehearing,
193 Wash. 275, 75 P. (2d) 579 (1938).2"REm. REv. STAT. § 7697.
20Abraham v. Department of Labor & Industries, 178 Wash. 160, 34 P.
(2d) 457 (1934); Luton v. Department of Labor & Industries, 183 Wash.
105, 48 P. (2d) 199 (1935); Ek v. Department of Labor & Industries, 181
Wash. 91, 41 P. (2d) 1097 (1935).
"'Prince v. Saginaw Logging Co., 197 Wash. 4, 84 P. (2d) 397 (1938);
Hama Hama Logging Co. v. Department of Labor & Industries, 157 Wash.
96, 288 Pac. 655 (1930), supra.
:sState ex rel. Winningham v. Olinger, 190 Wash. 697, 70 P. (2d) 317
(1937); Woodard v. Department of Labor & Industries, 188 Wash. 93, 61
P. (2d) 1003 (1936).
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application of the employer operates as a stay of proceedings and sus-
pends the right of the claimant to receive payment-of his award pend-
ing a decision by the joint board1 9 The employer has a right to
appear and be represented at hearings before the joint board.2 0 It is
important that the employer introduce before the joint board whatever
evidence is available. Under a 1939 amendment to the Act neither
party is permitted to introduce evidence in court in addition to that
contained in the departmental record.21
The jurisdiction of the joint board is appellate only and the scope
of the issues involved in the rehearing is limited by the department's
order which is under review.2 2 Only one rehearing before the joint
board is contemplated by the Act, no matter whether it is held on
the application of the employer or of the claimant. From the ruling
of the joint board on such rehearing the employer must appeal or be
bound thereby.23 Within thirty days after the final order of the joint
board has been communicated to the employer, he may appeal to the
superior court of the county of his residence.24 Such an appeal appar-
ently does -not act as a supersedeas but the claimant is entitled to
receive payment of the award made by the joint board pending dis-
position of the appeal.25 However, if the employer is successful on his
appeal, he is entitled to have the cost of the accident stricken from his
cost experience,26 leaving for future determination the knotty problem
as to the source from which the department is to obtain funds for
payment of such a claim in the event that it is subsequently reversed
by the courts.
In all court proceedings the matter is heard de novo, the decision of
the department is presumed to be prima facie correct, and the burden
of proof is on the party attacking the same.2 T The employer has the
right to participate in the superior court proceedings and to appeal
from any adverse judgment of the court, even though no formal attempt
to intervene has been made and no order permitting intervention has
been entered. 28 The right of participation is of somewhat doubtful
value since the enactment of the 1939 amendment stating that either
party (meaning the claimant) shall be entitled to a trial by jury upon
19State ex rel. Crabb v. Olinger, 191 Wash. 534, 71 P. (2d) 545 (1937),
supra.
"'Mud Bay Logging Co. v. Department of Labor & Industries, 189 Wash.
285, 64 P. (2d) 1054 (1937); affirmed on rehearing, 193 Wash. 275, 75 P. (2d)
579 (1938).
"RnL REv. STAT. § 7697-2.
"Woodard v. Department of Labor & Industries, 188 Wash. 93, 61 P.
(2d) 1003 (1936).
=AIbrecht v. Department of Labor & Industries, 192 Wash. 520, 74 P.
(2d) 22 (1937).
"RPE1m.L REV. STAT. § 7697.
"State ex rel. Crabb v. Olinger, 196 Wash. 308, 82 P. (2d) 865 (1938)
.supra.
2Mud Bay Logging Co. v. Department of Labor & Industries, 189 Wash.
285, 64 P. (2d) 1054 (1937), supra; affirmed on rehearing, 193 Wash. 275,
75 P. (2d) 579 (1938).
"REm. REv. STAT. § 7697; Eyer v. Department of Labor & Industries, 101
Wash. Dec. 473, 96 P. (2d) 1115 '(1939); Hoff v. Department of Labor & In-
dustries, 198 Wash. 257, 88 P. (2d) 419 (1939), supra.
"Hoff v. Department of Labor & Industries, 198 Wash. 257, 88 P. (2d)
419 (1939), supra; Cole v. Department of Labor & Industries, 200 Wash. 296,
93 P. (2d) 413 (1939), supra.
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demand,29 whereas before the amendment the calling of a jury was
discretionary in the trial court."' At the time this is being written
the supreme court has not interpreted the 1939 amendment with respect
to whether it changes the effect of the jury's verdict. However, a
reasonable interpretation of it is that the verdict is still merely advisory
and that it is the function of the court to determine in the final analysis
whether the department's decision is correct.31
Conclusion
The foregoing represents a sincere effort to state the law as it exists
today and no attempt has been made to state what the law should be.
It is generally agreed among the members of the bar of this state that
the Workmen's Compensation Act needs a thoroughgoing revision, at
least to the extent of clarification and simplification of the procedural
provisions. One-half day of the coming Legal Institute, to be held in
conjunction with the State Bar Association convention at Olympia next
August, will be devoted to the subject of workmen's compensation. It
is hoped that the representative committee in charge of his portion of
the program will have some constructive suggestions to offer respecting
a revision of the law.
2"REm. REV. STAT. § 7697-2.
1°Hodgen v. Department of Labor & Industries, 194 Wash. 541, 78 P.(2d) 949 (1938), and cases following it.
"1See Hodgen v. Department of Labor & Industries, 194 Wash. 541,
78 P. (2d) 949 (1938), supra; REm. REv. STAT. § 7697.
New Federal District Court Rules
The following rules have been announced by Judges John C. Bowen
and Lloyd L. Black for the United States District Court, Western
District of Washington, effective April 24, 1940:
"In all civil actions tried by jury, including those to which the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are not made applicable as well as those to
which such Rules are applicable, the Court may direct that one or twojurors in addition to the regular panel be called and impanelled to sit as
alternate jurors. Alternate jurors in the order in which they are called
shall replace jurors who, prior to the time the jury retires to consider
its verdict, become unable or disqualified to perform their duties.
Alternate jurors shall be drawn in the same manner, shall have the same
qualifications, shall be subject to the same examination and challenges,
shall take the same oath, and shall have the same functions, powers,
facilities, and privileges as the principal jurors. An alternate juror who
does not replace a principal juror shall be discharged after the jury
retires to consider its verdict. If one or two alternate jurors are called
each party is entitled to one peremptory challenge in addition to those
otherwise allowed by law. The additional peremptory challenge may be
used only against an alternate juror, and the other peremptory chal-
lenges allowed by law shall not be used against the alternates. * * *
"When any action or proceeding on the calendar of a judge of this
court is to be dismissed upon stipulation of the parties or upon plaintiff's
motion before defendant's appearance, the order for such dismissal may
in the absence of the judge on whose calendar the matter is pending be
signed and entered by any other judge of this court who is present and
consents to hear the matter. * * *"
